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INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND THE HIGHWAY 
CASES: COMPENSATION FOR ABUTTING 
LANDOWNERS 
Richard Kahn * 
Where are you going my beautiful friend? 
Is this the road that we take till the end? 
And if we break down, are we left behind? 
Is this the highway of all mankind?! 
I. HITTING THE ROAD: THE INTRODUCTION 
You wake up one morning and walk across the floor of your home, 
rubbing your eyes which are swollen from another night of fitful, 
disrupted sleep. As you walk, you feel the vibrations in your home 
which often rattle your dishes and windows. You reach the window of 
your living room that faces your front yard and you lift up the blinds 
that had been drawn the night before in a futile attempt to keep out 
the glare of passing headlights. With the blinds up, you squint through 
the layer of oily dust which has collected on your windows. It is the 
summer, but the windows must stay shut or the dirt, smoke, fumes, 
and noise will completely fill your house. As you stare out over your 
front lawn your eyes focus on the "For Sale" sign which has stood 
there for months as a subtle reminder of what your property has 
become. Your kids no longer play in this yard because the flying debris 
and occasional careening automobile make the yard too dangerous. 
You cannot have barbecues out there because the noise, which at 
times drowns out conversation or the sound of the television inside 
the house, is completely unbearable outside. 
* Production Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 BIG AUDIO DYNAMITE II, The Globe, on THE GLOBE (Columbia 1991). 
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Your focus now shifts to the new six-lane superhighway which lays 
no more than 100 feet beyond your property line. It is this majestic 
roadway which has rendered your property unfit for residential use. 
The thousands of cars which pass your house every day enjoy the 
incredible convenience of this asphalt giant; you, however, have re-
ceived only misery. As you shift your eyes to your left, you reflect on 
the irony in the fact that your neighbors, who had one-fifth of their 
front yard condemned during the highway construction as a right of 
way, received ample compensation for the collapse in the market value 
of their entire property resulting from the attendant deleterious ef-
fects of living next to a highway. Because you had no part of your 
property condemned for the highway construction, you have received 
nothing.2 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions would fail to provide 
you-or any other similarly situated property owner-with a means 
of compensation for these damages.3 Conversely, virtually all courts 
would allow compensation if even the tiniest fraction of private prop-
erty was condemned for a right of way for highway construction. 
These same courts would arbitrarily exclude from compensation prop-
erty owners who merely abut the newly constructed highway.4 
A few innovative jurisdictions, however, have begun to apply a 
theory of inverse condemnation that allows compensation for dam-
ages to highway abutters.5 This theory of inverse condemnation, clev-
2 Although this story is fictional, the details were gleaned from a number of real situations. 
See, e.g., Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. dismissed, 
219 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); Reisenauer v. State, Dep't of Highways, 813 P.2d 375 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1991); Adams v. Department of Highways, 753 P.2d 846 (Mont. 1988); Tracie Cone, Finally 
... Some Peace and Quiet! Is Noisy, Dusty, Construction-Mangled 1-95 Making You Crazy? 
What If You Lived Next To It?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7, 1990, at Dl; Stephen C. Fehr, Along 
Noisy Interstate, a Hue and Cry for a Wall, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1993, at Dl; David lams, 
Living Alongside 1-295 Is a Noisy Affair, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 15, 1984, at C28. 
3 See irifra notes 54--74 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 33--52 and accompanying text. One commentator has observed that: 
[T]he cutting edge of the prevailing rules of proximity damages is not the logic of 
distance but the accident of location of the injury-producing activity upon land taken 
from the claimant. If no part of the claimant's land has been taken for the project, 
though it be immediately adjoining, he must suffer resulting proximity losses without 
recourse; but if a partial taking occurs, however slight, those losses are compensable 
as severance damages. 
Arvo Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative 
Modifications in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 505 (1969); see David M. Setter, Note, 
Highway Noise: To Compensate or Not To Compensate, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 145, 158 (1980-81). 
5 Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Thomsen 
v. State, 170 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1969); Knight v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 
1992); Knight v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 141, 145 (Mont. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 212 
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erly termed "condemnation-by-nuisance" by one commentator,6 has 
been widely accepted in the context of property owners situated near 
airports.7 
This Comment examines the current plight of highway abutters and 
explores the possibility of applying inverse condemnation as a means 
of supporting a claim for damages caused by a property owner's 
proximity to a newly constructed or widened highway. Section II 
explores the highway construction and condemnation scenario and 
reviews the limited options currently available to highway abutters.8 
Section III reviews the "airport cases" and how some courts have 
applied a theory of inverse condemnation to support an award of 
damages to property owners near an airport whose property was not 
condemned and has not suffered a technical trespass.9 Section IV 
explores how the inverse condemnation analysis from the airport 
cases may be applied to highway cases. This section concludes with 
an argument that the condemnation-by-nuisance approach should be 
universally adopted to compensate landowners whose properties lie 
adjacent to highways.lo 
II. THE HIGHWAY PROBLEM: THE COURTS TAKING A WRONG 
TuRN 
Highways, as a key element of the American transportation system, 
have greatly influenced the social and economic organization of the 
country.ll On a broad scale, highways facilitate travel and migration,12 
whereas the accessibility created by highways attracts investment 
and industrial development to local communities.13 Although specific 
communities benefit from the construction of a highway, individual 
landowners are subjected to the deleterious effects that highways 
bring to the vicinity: increased and disruptive noise levels,14 pollution 
A.2d 564, 570--71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 218 A.2d 153 (N.J. 
1966); Lambier v. City of Kennewick, 783 P.2d 596, 599 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 
791 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990); City of Yakima v. Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 630--31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
6 William B. Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and 
Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REV. 207, 209 (1967). 
7 See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 11-75 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 76-143 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 144-204 and accompanying text. 
11 MARK H. ROSE, INTERSTATE at xiii (1990). 
12Id. 
13 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HIGHWAYS 75-77 (1976). 
14 See, e.g., People v. Volunteers of Am., 98 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Knight 
v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 141, 143 (Mont. 1982); City of Thlsa v. Mingo Sch. Dist. No. 16, 559 
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from exhaust fumes and highway dust and debris,15 vibrations from 
continuous traffic,16 glaring lights from passing vehicles,17 and the 
accident potential from a high volume of rapidly moving trucks and 
automobiles.18 These negative effects are the focus of compensation 
awards in highway eminent domain proceedings. 
Before a highway can be constructed, the government must first 
acquire property for rights-of-way on which to build the highway. 
This property is often acquired from private landowners.19 The gov-
ernment accomplishes this acquisition through the power of eminent 
domain.20 In its simplest form, eminent domain refers to the power of 
a government to "compel its subject to give up property interests in 
land or things."21 The government can only invoke the power of emi-
nent domain as part of a legitimate governmental function, such as 
for the public welfare.22 If the federal government takes private prop-
erty23 for a public use, then, pursuant to the "takings" clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the government 
must compensate the private property owner for his or her 10ss.24 
Each state, with the exception of North Carolina, has a similar clause 
in its state constitution requiring compensation for the taking of 
P.2d 487, 489 (Okl. Ct. App.1976); City of Yakima v. Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 629-30 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1971). 
15 See Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
Knight v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Mont. 1992); Adams v. Department of Highways, 
753 P.2d 846, 846-47 (Mont. 1988). 
16 See Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), eert. 
dismissed, 219 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); Jacobson v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 539 P.2d 641, 642 (Or. 
1979). 
17 See Richmond County v. Williams, 137 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); City of Billings, 
642 P.2d at 143. 
18 See Reisenauer v. State, 813 P.2d 375, 377 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); City of Billings, 642 P.2d 
at 143; State v. Board of Educ., 282 A.2d 71, 74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971); Lambierv. City 
of Kennewick, 783 P.2d 596, 597 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 791 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990). 
19 See DANIEL S. Guy, STATE HIGHWAY CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES 9 (1971). 
20 See id. at 3-6. 
21 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 4 (1977). 
22 See id. at 20, 21. 
23 One court has defined the term "property" as, "comprehend[ing] not only the thing pos-
sessed, but also, in strict legal parlance, mean[ing] the rights of the owner in relation to land or 
a thing; the right of a person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of it, and the corresponding 
right to exclude others from the use." Duffield v. DeKaib County, 249 S.E.2d 235, 237 (Ga. 1978). 
One commentator echoed a similar explanation: "The term property has been successively 
broadened to include all types of interests in land, stretching beyond fee title to include 
leaseholds, future interests, materialman's liens, contracts-in other words, all rights to use, 
dispose of, and enjoy dominion over property." ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
EMINENT DOMAIN 80 (1987) (emphasis in original). 
24 The Constitution states in relevant part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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private property for public use.25 Furthermore, twenty-six states also 
include a provision that compensates individuals for property that is 
damaged by the government in the course of a governmental activ-
ity-such as in the construction of a public improvement-as well as 
for that which is taken for public use.26 
In the context of highway construction, a governmental highway 
agency frequently employs the power of eminent domain to acquire 
lands for rights-of-way on which a highway will be built.27 The high-
way authority generally has the power to condemn whatever land is 
necessary for a construction project, whether the land be entire prop-
erties or merely portions of properties.28 In a condemnation proceed-
ing for the acquisition of property, the government must pay a con-
demnee the fair market value for the land condemned.29 Additionally, 
virtually all jurisdictions recognize some form of constitutionally man-
dated compensation to a property owner for damages to the remain-
der of the property that a highway's presence creates when some part 
of the owner's property has been condemned for construction of a 
highway.30 This measure of compensation exists in the form of "sev-
erance" or "consequential" damages which generally are described as 
the damages that are caused to the property remaining in the private 
landowner's possession following a partial condemnation.3! However, 
25 STOEBUCK, supra note 21, at 5. Although North Carolina lacks an eminent domain or taking 
clause in its constitution, ''the state's supreme court has enunciated the principles and has been 
most liberal in applying them." [d. at 6. 
26 [d. at 5; see, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 22; Mo. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 26; N.D. 
CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
One commentator notes: "The 'damaging' language has the effect of more or less facilitating 
compensation for certain kinds of nontresspassory takings, though every act for which compen-
sation has been allowed as a damaging has, in some jurisdictions, also been compensated as a 
taking." STOEBUCK, supra note 6, at 5-tl. 
'l:l GUY, supra note 19, at 21-22. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. at 5-tl. 
30 See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 453 (Cal. 1961); Knight 
v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992); State v. Board of Educ., 282 A.2d 71, 76 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Touchberry, 148 S.E.2d 
747, 748-49 (S.C. 1966). 
31 See, e.g., Symons, 357 P.2d at 453; City of Missoula, 827 P.2d at 1276; State v. Board of 
Educ., 282 A.2d at 76; Touchberry, 148 S.E.2d at 748-49. Although many courts frequently use 
the terms "severance" and "consequential" interchangeably to describe the compensable dam-
ages caused to the remainder or noncondemned property, some courts use "severance" to denote 
the compensable damages to the remainder and "consequential" to denote those damages that 
are generally not compensable. For the purposes of clarity and consistency, this Comment will 
only use the term "severance" to refer to the compensable damages to the remainder and will 
use the term "consequential" to refer generally to damages that are a consequence of the 
presence of the public use (highway), whether the damages are compensable or not. 
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the extent of compensation for these damages varies depending on 
the jurisdiction.32 
A. Salvation for the Condemned: Compensation for the Property 
Owner Whose Land Has Been Partially Condemned 
Some courts allow for compensation for consequential damages 
from highways only in the most narrow contexts. These courts pro-
vide for recovery in circumstances where there has been a direct 
physical invasion caused by the construction of a highway that would 
be actionable under common law, such as a loss of the land's lateral 
support or a flooding of the property that the construction of a high-
way causes.SS These courts reason that state constitutional provisions 
that require compensation anticipate an actual physical injury to the 
land and not "something which merely affects the senses of the per-
sons who use the property."34 On the other hand, some courts grant 
compensation for all damages that the proximity of the entire high-
way causes to the remainder.35 In these jurisdictions, as long as the 
government has taken part of the original parcel of property, the court 
entitles the condemnees to recovery for the complete diminution of 
value that their property suffers as a consequence of abutting the new 
highway.36 These courts reason that when assessing the impact of a 
public improvement on the remainder of a partially condemned parcel 
of private property, the parcel of land "should be considered as a 
whole."s7 
Other courts only allow compensation for those damages attribut-
able to the portion of the construction project located on the con-
demned piece of property.38 Thus, if the government condemns a 100 
square foot section of an individual's property for a highway right-of-
way, the individual's severance damages will be limited to the dam-
ages caused by the section of highway that lays on the 100 square feet 
of land rather than the damages caused by the highway as an en-
32 See State v. Carroll, 587 A.2d 260, 268-69 (N.J. 1991) (citing numerous jurisdictions and their 
varying standards of compensation). 
33 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 542 P.2d 1405, 1406 (Okla. 1975); State v. Williams, 452 P.2d 881, 
882-83 (Utah 1969). 
34 Williams, 452 P.2d at 883; see Cook, 542 P.2d at 1406. 
36 See, e.g., State v. Bland, 355 So. 2d 283, 285 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Touchberry, 148 S.E.2d at 
748-49. 
36 See, e.g., Bland, 355 So. 2d at 285; Touchberry, 148 S.E.2d at 748-49. 
37 Touchberry, 148 S.E.2d at 749; see Bland, 366 So. 2d at 285. 
38 See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 454 (Cal. 1961); Mason 
v. Department of Transp., 283 S.E.2d 690, 690 (Ga. 1981); State v. Board of Educ., 282 A.2d 71, 
76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971). 
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tirety.39 These courts reason that because the property owners would 
not be able to recover compensation for damages to their properties 
from the entire highway in the absence of a partial taking, the prop-
erty owners' compensation for the partial taking should be limited to 
the value of the land taken plus only those damages caused by the 
taking.40 In calculating the exact amount of recovery, these courts 
typically allow consideration of damages from the entire highway 
where the damages caused by the portion located on the condemned 
property are inseparable from the damages caused by the whole 
highway.41 For example, in the hypothetical where 100 square feet of 
land is condemned, if the amount of damages caused by the noise and 
dust originating from the section of highway on the 100 square feet 
of land is indistinguishable from the damages caused by the dust and 
noise originating from the highway as a whole, then the latter dam-
ages may be considered in the calculation of the severance award.42 
Courts draw a distinction, however, where the strip of condemned 
land is taken for a peripheral use, such as a fence, and not for actual 
highway.43 In those circumstances compensation would be restricted 
to the limited amount of damages which were a consequence of the 
erection of the fence.44 
Other courts provide for compensation only where the damages to 
the remainder are "special or peculiar" to that piece of property.45 
These courts reason that an individual should not be able to recover 
compensation for effects suffered by the general public.46 Damages 
from highway traffic which are common to the general public, such as 
noise or dust, are not compensable in these jurisdictions.47 For exam-
ple, a number of properties may be partially condemned for a highway 
construction project. Collectively, the landowners will not be able to 
39 See, e.g., Symons, 357 P.2d at 454; Mason, 283 S.E.2d at 690; State v. Board of Educ., 282 
A.2d at 76. 
40 See, e.g., Symons, 357 P.2d at 454; Mason, 283 S.E.2d at 690; State v. Board of Educ., 282 
A.2d at 76. 
41 See State v. Board of Educ., 282 A.2d at 77. 
42 See id. 
43 People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1961). 
44 [d. 
45 City of Lakewood v. DeRoos, 631 P.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Department of 
Transp. v. Reckamp, 291 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n 
v. Colonial Inn, Inc., 149 So. 2d 851, 855 (Miss. 1963); State v. Mertz, 778 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1989). 
46 City of Lakewood, 631 P.2d at 1142-43; Reckamp, 291 N.E.2d at 870; Mertz, 778 S.W.2d at 
368. 
47 City of Lakewood, 631 P.2d at 1142-43; Reckamp, 291 N.E.2d at 870; Mertz, 778 S.W.2d at 
368. 
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recover for general noise and pollution damages to their properties. 
However, a specific landowner whose property is situated such that 
the property suffers damages beyond that to which the neighboring 
properties are subjected may be able to recover for those extraordi-
nary consequential damages.48 
Finally, some courts, in calculating a severance award, recognize 
consequential damages from highways as a factor to be considered in 
determining the decrease in market value to the remainder of a prop-
erty rather than as a separate item of compensable damages.49 In 
these jurisdictions, courts consider the effect that increased noise 
from traffic has on the market value of the remainder in calculating 
the recoverable diminution in the property's market value.50 However, 
property owners cannot recover damages for the presence of the noise 
itself.51 This is because courts reason that, in calculating the diminu-
tion in market value of a parcel of land, a jury should consider all of 
the elements that a prospective purchaser of that land would con-
sider.52 
B. The Dead End: Noncompensation for the Property Owner 
Whose Land Abuts a Highway but Has Not Been Condemned 
Whereas an overwhelming majority of courts compensate partially 
condemned property owners for consequential damages in some form, 
most of these courts simultaneously deny compensation to the prop-
erty owner whose property lies adjacent to a newly constructed or 
widened highway but has not been partially condemned.53 In such 
48 See Colonial Inn, Inc., 149 So. 2d at 855 (motel situated at intersection near newly con-
structed highway suffered from proximity of highway more so than other properties in area 
because motel was commercial business and thus was able to recover for consequential dam-
ages). Properties in the same vicinity may suffer different effects from a new highway depend-
ing on the local topography or the properties' exact distance from the roadway. See infra notes 
178-83 and accompanying text. 
49 See, e.g., State v. Garrick, 256 So. 2d 111, 114 (La. 1971); Dennison v. State, 239 N.E.2d 708, 
710 (N.Y. 1968); City of Thlsa v. Mingo Sch. Dist. No. 16,559 P.2d 487, 491-92 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1976); City of Yakima v. Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 630 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
50 See, e.g., Garrick, 256 So. 2d at 114; Dennison, 239 N.E.2d at 710; City of Tulsa, 559 P.2d at 
491-92; City of Yakima, 485 P.2d at 630. 
51 See, e.g., Garrick, 256 So. 2d at 114; Dennison, 239 N.E.2d at 710; City of Tulsa, 559 P.2d at 
491-92; City of Yakima, 485 P.2d at 630. 
52 City of Tulsa, 559 P.2d at 491-92; see Garrick, 256 So. 2d at 114; Dennison, 239 N.E.2d at 
710; City of Yakima, 485 P.2d at 630. 
53 See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1961); 
Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 712-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. dismissed, 
219 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); Department of Transp. v. Bonnett, 358 S.E.2d 245, 246 (Ga. 1987); 
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cases, however, the property owner theoretically could bring a cause 
of action in inverse condemnation. 
Inverse condemnation refers to a cause of action against a govern-
ment defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken 
in fact by the government, even though the government has not 
formally exercised the power of eminent domain.54 Although these 
property owners may suffer the same deleterious effects from passing 
traffic as their neighbors who had strips of land actually condemned 
for highway construction, the property owners are denied compensa-
tion because they fail to meet the threshold eminent domain require-
ment of partial condemnation. 55 
For example, in Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Colo-
nial Inn, Inc., the defendant motel owners had only .02 acres of their 
property condemned for the widening of a highway. 56 Nevertheless, 
because the motel owners satisfied the threshold requirement of at 
least some condemnation of their original property, the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi awarded the motel owners compensation for the dam-
ages caused to the remainder of their property by the noise and 
vibrations of the adjacent highway. 57 The court opined that the state 
constitutional guarantee of just compensation required that the motel 
owners receive compensation for the resulting diminution in value of 
their property.58 If, however, the highway had been widened up to the 
motel's property line without requiring the condemnation of the .02 
acre strip of land, the motel owners would not have been entitled to 
any compensation for the consequential damages.59 Thus, where the 
Adams v. Department of Highways, 753 P.2d 846, 850 (Mont. 1988); Dennison v. State, 239 
N.E.2d 708, 710 (N.Y. 1968); Harris County v. Felts, 881 S.W.2d 866, 869-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
54 Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 101 n.1 (Or. 1962); JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 
NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.01[4][a], at 8-30 (rev. 3d ed. 1994). 
55 See, e.g., Symons, 357 P.2d at 455; Northcutt, 209 So. 2d at 712-13; Bonnett, 358 S.E.2d at 
246; Adams, 753 P.2d at 850; Dennison, 239 N.E.2d at 710; Harris County, 881 S.W.2d at 869-70. 
56 149 So. 2d 851, 852-53 (Miss. 1963). 
57Id. at 855; see State v. Carroll, 587 A.2d 260 (N.J. 1991) (holding defendant property owner 
entitled to compensation for noise damages to remaining property from adjacent highway where 
less then two-tenths of an acre of defendant's property had been condemned for highway 
project). But see Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Butler, 438 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1969) (holding defendant property owner not entitled to compensation for noise damages where 
only four percent of defendant's property condemned for highway construction). 
58 Colonial Inn, 149 So. 2d at 855-56. 
59 See id.; see also Harris County, 881 S.W.2d at 867-70. In Harris County v. Felts, the County 
planned to condemn one square foot of the Felts' property as a right of way for the construction 
of a four lane major thoroughfare. 881 S.W.2d at 867. Following an appraisal of prospective 
damages to the Felts' property due to the property's proximity to the highway, the County 
decided not to condemn the small portion of the Felts' land in order to avoid expending funds. 
Id. at 868. Rather than rerouting the highway altogether, the County constructed the highway 
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government has not physically appropriated property, a traditional 
application of inverse condemnation theory, premised on a showing of 
an actual physical taking, results in no compensation for an abutting 
landowner.60 
Without a means for recovery under the commonly-applied con-
demnation theories, the noncondemned landowner normally could find 
recourse through a common law action in private nuisance.61 However, 
even assuming a landowner could make out the requisite showing of 
a substantial unreasonable interference with the landowner's prop-
erty use caused by the defendant's intentional use of its land, the 
nuisance claim would be of limited efficacy because virtually all local, 
state, and federal governments claim a constitutionally or statutorily 
recognized immunity from nuisance claims as long as the government 
project has been legally authorized.62 To the extent that the construc-
tion and maintenance of roads is universally regarded as a legitimate 
governmental operation, a noncondemned landowner has no recourse 
under common law nuisance against the government.63 
Furthermore, property owners cannot try to hold individual non-
governmental users of highways liable for nuisance damages because 
this would place "an intolerable burden upon public transportation, 
travel and commerce."64 Because the government is responsible for 
constructing and maintaining a public use, it is the party that is 
ultimately liable to individual property owners for the harm that the 
next to the Felts' property. [d. The Texas Court of Appeals for the 14th District held that the 
Felts could not recover for the damages caused to their property as a result of the property's 
proximity to a major highway because there had been no physical appropriation of land. [d. at 
869-70. 
60 See, e.g., Symons, 357 P.2d at 455; Northcutt, 209 So. 2d at 712-13; Bonnett, 358 S.E.2d at 
246; Adams, 753 P.2d at 850; Dennison, 239 N.E.2d at 710. 
6! A private nuisance is "a civil wrong, based on disturbance of rights in land." WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 572 (1971). Plaintiffs bringing a case of private 
nuisance are required to prove that: "(1) they have suffered substantial unreasonable interfer-
ence with property use, (2) the interference was caused by defendant's use of its land, and (3) 
that the defendant acted 'intentionally.'" ZYGMUNTJ. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 112 (1992). 
62 SACKMAN, supra note 54, at § 6.10[2], at 6-63 to 6-64; STOEBUCK, supra note 21, at 164. 
63 See STOEBUCK, supra note 21, at 21; see also SACKMAN, supra note 54, at 6-64. 
64 Jacobson v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 539 P.2d 641, 644 (Or. 1975) (holding property owner 
whose land abuts logging road could not sue logging truck company for vibration damage to 
house caused by passing logging trucks); see Blumenthal v. City of Cheyanne, 186 P.2d 556, 572 
(Wyo. 1947) (declining to enjoin truck route through city where ''the consequences complained 
of flow naturally and normally from the conduct of the traffic under proper authority"). But see 
West v. National Mines Corp., 285 S.E.2d 670, 673-77 (W. Va. 1981) (finding actionable cause of 
nuisance against coal lessee and contract haulers existed where dust kicked up by coal trucks 
traveling on local road permeated homes, interfered with breathing, fouled water, and made 
sleeping difficult). 
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operation of that public use causes to private properties.65 Thus, abut-
ting landowners have no recourse against nongovernmental entities.66 
A few courts have applied an inverse condemnation theory and 
allowed compensation to noncondemned property owners whose prop-
erties have been adversely affected by their proximity to a new 
highway.67 The circumstances in which the plaintiffs in these cases 
were harmed, however, are drastic and extreme.66 For example, in 
Thomsen v. State, a newly constructed four lane highway passed 
within ten feet of the plaintiff's bedroom with only a wire fence 
separating the roadway from the plaintiff's property line.69 The Su-
preme Court of Minnesota, after explaining that noise, light, fumes, 
and vibrations from traffic are ordinarily noncompensable inconven-
iences, nevertheless held that the plaintiff could recover damages.7o 
The court observed that the "unique" and "unusual" facts of the 
case-the headlights of passing cars shining directly into the plain-
tiff's window, the loud noise of the traffic continuing throughout the 
day and night, and only a wire fence serving as protection from 
vehicles traveling at high speeds-led to the conclusion that the plain-
tiff was entitled to compensation.71 
In light of the judicial reluctance to extend the constitutional tak-
ings concept to include non condemned highway abutters, in the over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions a property owner whose property 
is not at least partially condemned for a highway construction cannot 
recover damages under any legal theory.72 Evidently, to the extent 
that properties adjacent to highways endure the same damaging con-
65 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962). In Griggs, the defendant municipality 
owned and leased an airport which was found to have imposed a servitude on the plaintiff's 
property. [d. Rather than hold the individual airlines and airplane operators liable for the taking, 
the Court held that the municipality, as constructor and owner of the airport, was responsible 
for the constitutional taking which had occurred as a result of the operation of the airport. [d. 
66 See id. This Comment uses the term "nongovernmental" to refer to purely private parties. 
67 Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566 (Cal. App. 1984); Thomsen v. 
State, 170 N.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Minn. 1969); Knight v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 
1992); Knight v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 141, 145-46 (Mont. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 
212 A.2d 564, 570-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 218 A.2d 153 (N.J. 
1966); Lambier v. City of Kennewick, 783 P.2d 596, 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied, 791 
P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990); City of Yakima v. Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 630-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
68 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
69 170 N.W.2d at 577. 
70 [d. at 579. 
71 [d. at 579-80; see Palmer, 212 A.2d at 570-71 (finding school entitled to compensation where 
newly constructed six-lane superhighway would circle school property, passing within 40 feet 
of school building); City of Yakima, 485 P.2d at 630-31 (compenstaing building owner for 
intolerable noise levels where 20-foot high wall of highway ramp constructed next to warehouse 
created echo chamber which amplified traffic noise). 
72 See, e.g., People ex reI. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1961); 
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sequences of highway noise, pollution, and safety hazards irrespective 
of whether the property has been condemned, the current judicial 
interpretation of takings law is arbitrary and hypocritical. 73 The losses 
sustained by two neighboring properties may be economically and 
physically similar. Under the majority view, however, if one of the 
properties has been partially condemned and the other has not, the 
former will be fully compensated and the latter will receive nothing.74 
Confronted with a similarly arbitrary and inequitable application of 
takings law in the context of property owners living near airports, 
courts have developed a theory of inverse condemnation to provide 
for a more just compensation of negatively affected property own-
ers.75 An application of this theory to the highway context may pro-
vide relief for highway abutters. 
III. MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL FROM A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW: THE 
AIRPORT CASES 
For several decades federal and state courts have awarded dam-
ages, on a theory of inverse condemnation, to plaintiffs whose prop-
erties are situated near airport takeoff and landing runways.76 Al-
though courts have disagreed as to what circumstances necessitate 
that a plaintiff receive compensation,77 the decisions in these "airport 
cases" are premised upon the notion that the noise and pollution from 
airplanes flying close to property can effect a constitutionally cogni-
zable taking of that property.78 The theory of inverse condemnation 
Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 712-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. dismissed, 
219 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); Department of Transp. v. Bonnett, 358 S.E.2d 245, 246 (Ga. 1987); 
Adams v. Department of Highways, 753 P.2d 846, 850 (Mont. 1988); Dennison v. State, 239 
N.E.2d 708, 710 (N.Y. 1968). 
73 See Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
People v. Volunteers of Am., 98 Cal. Rptr. 423, 431 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); PAUL, supra note 
23, at 71; Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 505. 
74 PAUL, supra note 23, at 71; Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 506. 
75 See infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 26~7 (1946); Branning v. United States, 
654 F.2d 88, 102 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Foster v. City of Gainesville, 579 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (Or. 1962)[hereinafter "Thornburg 
F'J; Martin v. Port of Seat tie, 391 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). 
77 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 26~7 (holding that only frequent low-level flights over plaintiffs' 
property constitute compensable taking of property); Thornburg I, 376 P.2d at 106 (holding that 
substantial interference with use and enjoyment of property constitutes compensable taking of 
property); Martin, 391 P.2d at 545-46 (holding that any interference with use and enjoyment of 
property constitutes compensable damaging or taking of property). 
78 See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 26~7; Branning, 654 F.2d at 102; Foster, 579 So. 2d at 777; 
Thornburg I, 376 P.2d at 106; Martin, 391 P.2d at 545-46. 
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as applied in the airport cases can provide a basis by which to award 
damages to property owners whose properties abut highways.79 
A. The Airport Principle as Federally Expressed 
The first case that addressed the issue of government taking of 
private property rights by airplanes was United States v. Causby, 
which dealt with the issue of whether the adverse effects of airplanes 
flying directly over private property constitute a constitutionally rec-
ognized taking.80 The plaintiff sued the government on a theory of 
inverse condemnation, alleging that the continuous passage directly 
over his property of low-flying military aircraft from a nearby airbase 
was destroying the operation of his chicken ranch and thus was akin 
to a governmental taking of his property absent formal condemna-
tion proceedings.81 The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that where 
flights over property render the property uninhabitable, a taking 
occurs under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which consti-
tutes a loss as complete as if the government had taken exclusive pos-
session of the land through normal eminent domain procedures.82 The 
Court termed this acquired property right an "easement of flight."83 
The Court held that flights over an individual's private land are a 
taking if "they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and 
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of [a plaintiff's] 
land."84 In applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Court 
determined that the government had imposed a "servitude" on the 
land and thus had taken an easement from the plaintiff which required 
compensation.85 Although United States v. Causby was a watershed 
decision because of the Court's expansive reading of property rights 
and constitutional takings,86 the Court's holding was limited to the 
79 See STOEBUCK, supra note 21, at 236; Donald S. Black, Note, The Highway Cases: Noise 
As a Taking or Damaging of Property in California, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 425, 441 (1980). 
80 328 U.S. at 258. 
81 [d. at 258---59. 
82 [d. at 261. 
83 [d. In Branning v. United States, the United States Court of Claims noted: 
Such "taking" has been referred to in reported cases variously as an "navigation 
easement" (by analogy to the sovereign's right of navigational servitude in navigable 
waters of the sovereignty) and as an "easement of flight" (by analogy to easements 
taken by the sovereign in the airspace over land for public purposes). 
654 F.2d 88, 91 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
84 Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. 
85 [d. at 267. 
86 See Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 220-21. 
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extent that it applied only to the rare situation in which airplanes fly 
directly over a plaintiff's property.87 
The Supreme Court adhered to Causby's limited holding less than 
twenty years later in Griggs v. Allegheny County.88 In Griggs, the 
Court held that the defendant municipality, not the actual operators 
of the airplanes, was liable for taking an avigation easement from 
several homeowners.89 The Court held that the noise and vibrations 
created by low-altitude, commercial flights originating from a county 
airport flying directly over the plaintiffs' properties rendered the 
properties unfit for residential use.90 Citing Causby, the Court ex-
plained that "an invasion of the superadjacent airspace will often 
affect the use of the surface of the land itself."91 
The holdings of both Causby and Griggs were premised on trespass 
theory,92 with the Court determining that an avigation easement had 
been taken because the airplanes in both situations had physically 
invaded the airspace over the plaintiffs' property.93 Neither of these 
two decisions, nor any subsequent Supreme Court decision, has ad-
dressed the issue of compensation for property owners who live near 
87 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. 
88 369 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962). 
89 [d. 
90 [d. at 87-89. 
91 [d. at 89 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 265). 
92 Trespass to land-a tort to property-generally "requires an intentional entry upon land 
of another ... by personal entry or by causing an object to enter the land." DAN B. DOBBS, 
ToRTS AND COMPENSATION 57 (1985). 
93 See Griggs, 369 U.S. at 88-89; Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. Such an "invasion of airspace" 
analysis relies on the notion that a property owner's interest in the exclusive possession of their 
property extends above and below the ground surface. See PROSSER, supra note 61, at 69. 
Courts and commentators have frequently cited Lord Coke's utterance that "cujus est solum 
ejus est usque ad coelum"-he who possesses the land owns "upward unto heaven, and by 
analogy, downward into perdition." [d. at 70. However, the Supreme Court, in Causby, limited 
this heaven-to-hell notion, explaining in quite colorful language that "that doctrine has no place 
in the modern world ... common sense revolts at the idea." 328 U.S. at 261. The Court stated 
that federal statutes regulating navigational air space and operational altitudes for aircraft, 
coupled with the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, limited private ownership of 
property to that air space below the prescribed minimum altitudes of flight. [d. at 260-63. The 
Court asserted that the air space above the prescribed minimum altitudes is public domain. [d. 
at 263. In both Causby and Griggs, the aircraft at issue took off and landed over the plaintiffs' 
properties and below the prescribed minimum altitudes, and thus within the air space possessed 
by the plaintiffs. See Griggs, 369 U.S. at 88-89; Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. However, at least one 
state court has interpreted the Causby and Griggs holdings to be less concerned with "a physical 
displacement of air above the property," and more reliant upon the damages caused by noise 
and vibration. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
989 (1965). But see Thornburg I, 376 P.2d 100, 103 (Or. 1962) (interpreting Causby and Griggs 
to rely on trespass theory exclusively). 
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an airport where airplanes fly at low altitudes but do not fly directly 
over the affected properties. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, 
did address the issue of compensation for property owners who live 
near but not under the direct path of low-flying aircraft in Batten v. 
United States.94 In Batten, the plaintiffs owned property near an 
airport but the property did not lay directly under airplane flight 
paths.95 Although airplanes did not pass over the property, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the takeoffs and landings of airplanes nonetheless 
produced sound and shock waves on the property up to twenty deci-
bels beyond the level at which air force personnel are required to 
wear earplugs.96 Airplanes caused dishes and windows to rattle, made 
conversation and use of televisions impossible, interrupted sleep, and 
produced a smoke which left a black oily residue over plaintiffs' prop-
erty.97 Despite these compelling circumstances, the court held that the 
appropriate legal principles provided compensation for damages only 
where there had been an actual taking.98 The court asserted that in 
this case there had been "nothing more than an interference with [the] 
use and enjoyment" of the plaintiffs' property, and thus no compen-
sation was available.99 
Chief Justice Murrah wrote a scathing dissent in Batten.lOO Chief 
Justice Murrah began his dissent by noting that a property owner's 
peaceful enjoyment of his or her home is a "constitutionally protected 
property right."lOl Furthermore, the property owners' injured eco-
nomic interest in this case was indistinguishable from that which the 
Supreme Court had pronounced "taken" in Causby and GriggS.102 
Arguing that a constitutional taking does not turn on whether there 
has been an actual physical invasion of property, Murrah explained 
that "the Government may surely accomplish by indirect interference, 
the equivalent of an outright physical invasion."103 In support of this 
proposition, Murrah cited the Supreme Court case of Richards v. 
Washington Terminal. 104 In Richards, the Court held that although 
94 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cen. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963). 
95 [d. at 582. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. 
98 [d. at 583. 
99 [d. at 585. 
100 [d. (Murrah, C.J., dissenting). 
101 [d. at 58&-86. 
102 [d. at 586; see supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. 
103 Batten, 306 F.2d at 586 (Murrah, C.J., dissenting). 
104 [d. (citing Richards v. Washington Terminal, 233 U.S. 546 (1914)). 
578 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:563 
general damages to property from a nearby railroad were damnum 
absque injuria,105 those damages which were special and peculiar to a 
plaintiff's property created a burden that required compensation.l06 
From this, Murrah then delineated his constitutional test: 
First, whether the asserted interest is one which the law will 
protect; if so, whether the interference is sufficiently direct, suf-
ficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to cause us to con-
clude that fairness and justice, as between the State and the 
citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public and 
not by the individual alone. l07 
Chief Justice Murrah's dissent has formed the basis of the reasoning 
in the majority of the state decisions in the airport cases.l08 
B. The Airport Principle as Stated by the States 
The leading state decision in the airport inverse condemnation 
cases is the Oregon case of Thornburg v. Port of Portland (Thornburg 
I) .109 In Thornburg I, the plaintiffs lived near an airport but the 
plaintiffs' properties were not directly under the flight paths of air-
planes departing from and landing at the airport.l1o The plaintiffs 
claimed that the noise from the aircraft was a nuisance which had 
legally ripened into an easement, much as a nuisance by a private 
party can ripen into a prescription.11l Because the easement had been 
taken by a municipality, the plaintiffs contended that the easement 
constituted an unconstitutional taking, compensable under the theory 
of inverse condemnation.l1z 
In a well-reasoned decision, the Oregon Supreme Court laid out the 
analysis which supported the plaintiffs' claims.113 Laying the founda-
tion of its takings analysis, the court began with an acknowledgment 
105 "Damnum absque injuria" is defined as indicating "loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the 
legal sense; that is, without such breach of duty as is redressible by a legal action." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990). 
106 Richards v. Washington Terminal, 233 U.S. 546, 551 (1914). The "special and peculiar" 
damages in Richards referred to those damages caused by the extra smoke and soot that was 
directly blown onto the plaintiff's property by a fanning system that had been constructed to 
ventilate a railroad tunnel. Id. at 557. 
107 Batten, 306 F.2d at 587 (Murrah, C.J., dissenting). 
108 See, e.g., Thornburg I, 376 P.2d 100, 104 (Or. 1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540, 
546 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). 
109 376 P.2d at 100. 
110 [d. at 101. Cf Batten, 306 F.2d at 582, 585 (plaintiffs' property did not lie directly under 
flight paths of airplanes from nearby airport and thus plaintiffs not entitled to compensation for 
consequential damages). 
111 Thornburg [, 376 P.2d at 102. 
112 [d. 
113 [d. at 102-11. 
1995] INVERSE CONDEMNATION 579 
that noise can be a legal nuisance which, if loud enough or continuous 
enough, can ripen into an easement.114 The court explained that un-
reasonable noise can be a nuisance which, under common law, could 
be imposed upon one's neighbor by prescription as an easement for a 
nuisance.115 The court noted, however, that freedom from unreason-
able noise was also a protectable right, similar to other nuisance cases 
which had remedied an aggrieved party for being subjected to offen-
sive smells.116 
After establishing that a noise could be a nuisance which could ripen 
into an easement, the court proceeded to determine that "a nuisance 
can be such an invasion of the rights of a possessor as to amount to a 
taking, in theory at least, any time a possessor is in fact ousted from 
the enjoyment of his [sic] land."117 The court established, however, 
that it would only recognize a taking in circumstances where "the 
government substantially deprives the owner of the use of his land."118 
In further departing from the federal standard, the Oregon Su-
preme Court reasoned that noise coming from a location next to one's 
property can be just as damaging as noise originating perpendicularly 
from above one's property.119 The court argued that the angle from 
which the nuisance arose was irrelevant to the determination of the 
taking as long as there was a substantial deprivation of the use and 
the enjoyment of the property.120 The court refused to adopt the 
requirement adopted by most federal and state courts that the noise 
originate from a certain position in relation to a plaintiff's property. 121 
Such a requirement, the court reasoned, is arbitrary and contrary to 
114Id. at 102. An easement has been defined as "the right to enter upon and make some defined 
use of, but not have possession or seisin of, land owned by another." STOEBUCK, supra note 21, 
at 123. 
115 ThornlYurg I, 376 P.2d at 102. Prescription refers to the "acquisition of a personal right to 
use a way, water, light and air by reason of continuous usage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1183 
(6th ed. 1990). An easement by prescription is created where an individual's permissive use of 
another's property has been "open, continuous, exclusive, and under claim of right for [a] 
statutorily prescribed period with knowledge or imputed knowledge of the owner." Id. 
116 ThornlYurg I, 376 P.2d at 103. Various courts have held that odors from sewage plants can 
be a nuisance that can ripen into a prescriptive easement. See, e.g., City of Fayetteville v. 
Stanberry, 807 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Ark. 1991) (holding overflow and odor emanations from sewer 
line over period of time constituted continuing nuisance that had ripened into inverse condem-
nation); Duffield v. DeKalb County, 249 S.E.2d 235, 237 (Ga. 1978) (holding noise and odors from 
water pollution control plant constituted unlawful interference with property owner's right to 
use and enjoy property and thus constituted claim for inverse condemnation). 
117 ThornlYurg I, 376 P.2d at 105. The Thornburg I decision was apparently written before 
courts began to recognize that women possess land too. 
118Id. 
119Id. at 106. 
120 Id. 
121Id. at 107-09. 
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the logic of the taking argument insofar as the inquiry rests upon the 
interference with plaintiffs' use of their property irrespective of the 
position of the source of the interference.l22 
The Oregon Supreme Court had an opportunity to further explain 
this theory of law when the plaintiffs from the Thornburg I decision 
appeared before the court on another appeal in Thornburg II, follow-
ing a remand from the first case.l2B The jury in the remanded case had 
been instructed, pursuant to some vague language in Thornburg I, to 
weigh the social utility of the airport against the taking of property 
asserted by the plaintiffs before determining the appropriate award 
for damages.l24 In rejecting this balancing test, the court specifically 
cited to Chief Justice Murrah's dissent in Batten in holding that if the 
government's activities substantially interfered with the plaintiffs' 
use and enjoyment of their property, a taking occurred which must 
be compensated, irrespective of the utility of the public use. l25 The 
court declared that the benefit to the public in general from a particu-
lar public use did not diminish the individual property owner's dam-
age claims.126 
The Thornburg decisions represent a significant extension of the 
taking theory found in Causby and GriggS.127 The Thornburg decisions 
shifted the focus of judicial inquiry from the location of the source of 
the interference to the actual damage caused by the interference.l28 
One commentator has termed this inverse condemnation argument, 
"condemnation-by-nuisance."I29 
Since the decision in Thornburg I, a number of other state courts 
have been confronted with similar inverse condemnation actions in-
volving property owners who live near airports.l30 These courts have 
almost universally followed the Thornburg court's analysis.l3l For ex-
122 Id. 
123 Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 415 P.2d 750 (Or. 1966) [hereinafter "TJwrnburg IF'J. 
124 Id. at 751--52 (citing Thornburg I, 376 P.2d 100, 107 (Or. 1962». 
125 Id. at 752. 
126 Id. at 753. 
127 See Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 220-21. 
128 See Black, supra note 79, at 440. 
129 Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 209. 
130 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866 (Cal. 1985), em. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1964), em. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965); Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports COlum'n of 
Minneapolis & St. Paul, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1974); Henthorn v. City of Oklahoma City, 453 
P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1969); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964), em. denied, 379 U.S. 
989 (1965). 
181 See, e.g., Baker, 705 P.2d at 868; City of Jacksonville, 167 So. 2d at 102; Alevizos, 216 N.W.2d 
at 662; Hentharn, 453 P.2d at 1016; Martin, 391 P.2d at 546. 
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ample, in Martin v. Port of Seattle, the Washington Supreme Court 
relaxed the burden on the inverse condemnation plaintiff even further 
than that which Thornburg I established.l32 In Martin, plaintiffs al-
leged a set of facts similar to those in Thornburg I, including proxim-
ity to an airport and the resulting deleterious effects attributable to 
the flights of nearby aircraft.133 The Washington Supreme Court like-
wise dismissed the position that a taking requires a trespass.134 The 
court concluded that the taking analysis turned on the actual inter-
ference with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property.135 In 
articulating the inherent inequity of a trespass requirement, the court 
explained that it was "unable to accept the premise that recovery for 
interference with the use of land should depend upon anything as 
irrelevant as whether the wing tip of an aircraft passes through some 
fraction of an inch of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's land."136 
The court also noted that because the Washington constitution's emi-
nent domain clause has a "damaging" provision that mandates com-
pensation for private property that is either taken or damaged for 
public use, a physical invasion or direct overflight is unnecessary to 
establish a cause of action.137 
In differentiating itself from the Thornburg decisions, the Martin 
court stated that the level of interference required before the court 
would recognize that a taking had occurred need not be substantial/38 
the standard established by the Oregon Supreme Court in Thornburg 
1.139 The court reasoned that recovery in actions of inverse condem-
nation are based on a reduction in the property's market value. Thus, 
frivolous, incidental damages automatically would be precluded from 
recovery because such damages would not effect a measurable decline 
in market value.140 However, less-than-substantial damages, which 
would effect a decline in market value but would otherwise be ex-
cluded under a substantiality standard, would be recoverable.141 The 
court explained that it is illogical to suggest that simply because an 
injury is small the injury should be unrecoverable.142 After all, the 
132 391 P.2d at 546. 
133 [d. at 542-43. 
134 [d. at 545. 
135 [d. at 546. 
136 [d. at 545. 
137 [d. at 546. 
138 [d. 
139 See 376 P.2d 100, 105 (Or. 1962). 
140 Martin, 391 P.2d at 547. 
141 See id. 
142 [d. 
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court reasoned, the public's burden to pay for a small burden is 
equally as small.143 
IV. SHIFTING INTO HIGH GEAR: ApPLYING 
"CONDEMNATION-By-NUISANCE" TO THE HIGHWAY CASES 
It would seem a small logical step to apply the "condemnation-by-
nuisance" theory advanced in Thornburg and the subsequent airport 
cases to the situation of the property owner who lies adjacent to a 
highway.144 If noise, smoke, fumes, dust, and vibrations from airplanes 
can interfere so substantially with individuals' use and enjoyment of 
their property, then noise, smoke, fumes, dust, and vibrations, as well 
as intense lights and increased safety hazards, from a highway can 
similarly interfere with noncondemned individuals' use and enjoy-
ment of their property.145 Despite its theoretical soundness, this argu-
ment has not approached a level of universal acceptance in most 
jurisdictions. To the contrary, most courts have resisted compensating 
highway abutters whose properties have not been at least partially 
condemned.146 
A. State Courts that Have Heard the Noise and Seen the Light: 
Successful Claims in Inverse Condemnation 
A limited number of state courts have held that plaintiffs whose 
properties abut highways are entitled to compensation under their 
state constitutions.147 The facts of these cases, however, tend to be 
unusual and extreme, such as where the construction of a neighboring 
highway resulted in a virtual destruction of adjacent landowners' use 
of their property.l48 Nonetheless, a few courts have applied a condem-
nation-by-nuisance analysis-although not labeled as such-in cases 
where the facts are not as dramatic but are nonetheless compelling.149 
143 Id. 
144 See Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
STOEBUCK, supra note 21, at 163. 
145 STOEBUCK, supra note 21, at 163. 
146 See supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text. 
147 See Harding, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 566; Thomsen v. State, 170 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1969); 
Knight v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992); Knight v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 
141, 145 (Mont. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 212 A.2d 564, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 218 A.2d 153 (N.J. 1966); Lambier v. City of Kennewick, 783 P.2d 
596, 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 791 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990); City of Yakima v. 
Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 630-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
148 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra notes 150--60 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court of Montana has twice held that plaintiffs in 
inverse condemnation cases whose properties were in close proximity 
to a newly constructed or widened roadway were entitled to compen-
sation although no portions of the properties involved had been con-
demned.150 In Knight v. City of Billings, the city, in widening a major 
arterial street, condemned properties on the east side of the street 
for the construction project but did not condemn any of the plaintiffs' 
properties on the west side of the street. l5l The plaintiffs complained 
that the widening of the street resulted in a number of accidents in 
front of and on their properties which made it unsafe for their children 
to play on their lawns; rocks and rubbish being thrown onto their lawns 
and houses; noise so loud that doors had to be kept shut and sleep at 
night was difficult; dust and fumes that prevented people from venti-
lating their homes; vibrations which constantly shook houses; and the 
installation of new high intensity lights which created a glare.152 The 
court, citing the airport cases, held that the interference with the 
plaintiffs' "right to the peaceful possession of [their] residential prop-
erty" was direct, peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude so as to consti-
tute a taking by inverse condemnation.153 
The Supreme Court of Montana reasoned similarly in the more 
recent case of Knight v. City of Missoula. l54 In City of Missoula, a 
new road opened near the plaintiffs' neighborhood that increased 
traffic, dust, noise, and runoff problems in the vicinity and resulted in 
increased health problems, physical danger, and the plaintiffs' loss of 
the use and enjoyment of their homes and properties.155 In remanding 
the case back to the state district court, the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana explained that where "actual physical damage is proximately 
caused" to one's property by a public improvement, there may be a 
recovery in inverse condemnation as long as the "extent of damage 
be of such degree as to amount to a taking of an interest in the 
property damaged."156 
150 City of Missoula, 827 P.2d at 1276; City of Billings, 642 P.2d at 145. 
151 642 P.2d 141, 142 (Mont. 1982). 
152 [d. at 143. 
153 [d. at 145-46. 
154 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992). Apparently it is not easy having the last name "Knight" 
if you live in Montana: the plaintiffs in both Montana highway condemnation cases were named 
Knight. However, the "Knights" in Knight v. City of Billings were Earle and Hazel, 642 P.2d 
at 141, whereas the "Knights" in City of Missoula were Lorraine and the estate of her deceased 
husband, Ford. 827 P.2d at 1270. 
155 [d. at 1273. 
156 [d. at 1276. Cf Adams v. Department of Highways, 753 P.2d 846 (Mont. 1988). In Adams, 
a new bridge, located one-quarter of a mile from the plaintiffs' properties, was opened, increas-
ing traffic on a roadway that plaintiffs' properties abutted. [d. at 846-47. Although the Montana 
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The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District made an 
even clearer application of the condemnation-by-nuisance theory in 
the airport cases to a highway case.157 In Harding v. Department of 
Transportation, the California Department of Transportation pur-
chased several pieces of property for the widening of a highway.158 
Plaintiffs, whose properties abutted the new highway right-of-way, 
brought a multifaceted claim that alleged damages from noise, dust, 
dirt, and debris from the highway as well as a loss of air and light and 
increased temperatures from the construction of an embankment-a 
sound attenuation barrier-on the right-of-way.159 After rejecting a 
common law nuisance claim on grounds of statutorily-authorized gov-
ernmental immunity, the court turned to the plaintiffs' inverse con-
demnation claim.160 The court, after commenting on the incongruous 
results produced by a physical invasion requirement and noting that 
most courts have rejected an analogous direct overflight requirement 
in the airport cases, held that the plaintiffs' unique damages should 
be compensable under the inverse condemnation principle.161 
In each of the foregoing cases, courts applied the same theory of 
inverse condemnation which has supported numerous claims in the 
airport cases context to highway takings claims. These courts, how-
ever, do not reflect the majority view. Although the majority of courts 
consistently uphold inverse condemnation claims by adversely af-
fected plaintiffs living near airports, they have exhibited a reluctance 
to apply the same theory to adversely affected highway abutters, 
offering a variety of arguments in opposition to such a course of 
action.162 
Supreme Court acknowledged that a successful claim in inverse condemnation does not require 
an actual physical invasion of the property, the court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a 
noncompensable injury. [d. at 848. Aside from noting that a potential "Pandora's Box" could be 
opened if the plaintiffs were allowed recovery and that the inconveniences of traffic increases 
must inevitably follow a road improvement, the court-exhibiting a keen economic instinct 
coupled with a dismal grasp of the concept of "home"-stated that the plaintiffs' properties were 
zoned residential/commercial and thus the properties may have increased in value as commercial 
property. [d. at 850-53. 
157 See Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
158 [d. 
159 [d. at 563. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. at 565--66. Referring to the highway cases, the court explained, "people suffering 
damages from their proximity to a highway should not be unequally required to allege and prove 
a physical invasion." [d. at 566. 
162 See infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text. 
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B. Clearing the Smoke for Those Courts that Have Taken the 
Other Route: An Analysis of the Arguments Surrounding the 
Highway Cases 
585 
Despite the reasonableness and internal consistency of the condem-
nation-by-nuisance argument, many courts and commentators have 
resisted applying this theory of recovery to landowners whose prop-
erties abut highways.l63 Ironically, some jurisdictions that have ap-
plied the condemnation-by-nuisance theory to property owners living 
near airports have denied compensation to property owners living 
near highways.l64 Courts have advanced several arguments in deny-
ing compensation to highway abutters. 
1. Noise 
At least one court has argued that the airport cases are distinguish-
able from the highway cases insofar as the noise emitted from auto-
mobiles is not comparable to the noise produced by airplanes.165 How-
ever, this assertion does not defeat the validity of the theory of 
inverse condemnation in an appropriate case.l66 If courts are willing 
to apply the "substantial interference" test articulated in Thornburg 
1,167 circumstances could conceivably arise where the noise from high-
way traffic interferes with a property owner's use and enjoyment of 
his or her property to the same extent as noise from airplanes.l68 
168 See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 454 (Cal. 1961); 
Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), eert. dismissed, 219 
So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); Department of Transp. v. Bonnett, 358 S.E2d 245, 246 (Ga. 1987); Adams 
v. Department of Highways, 753 P.2d 846, 850, 853 (Mont. 1988); Dennison v. State, 239 N.E.2d 
708, 710 (N.Y. 1968). 
164 In Florida, the state appellate courts have routinely compensated property owners whose 
properties lie near or under the flight paths of airplanes taking off from and landing at nearby 
airports. See Foster v. City of Gainesville, 579 So. 2d 77 4, 77~ 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); City 
of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), eert. denied, 172 So. 
2d 597 (Fla. 1965). However, in Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, the Florida District Court of 
Appeals for the Third District expressly declined to apply the holdings of the airport cases to 
a situation where a property owner's house and property, and the beneficial use and enjoyment 
thereof, were damaged from the construction and operation of an adjacent highway. 209 So. 2d 
at 711-12. 
165 Northcutt, 209 So. 2d at 711. 
166 See Black, supra note 79, at 443. 
167 376 P.2d 100, 1~7 (Or. 1962). 
168 See Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
Thomsen v. State, 170 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1969); City of Yakima v. Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 
629--31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
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Furthermore, the noise level of highway traffic need not reach the 
noise level of air traffic in order to constitute an interference so 
substantial as to effect a taking of property.169 The noise level created 
by a continuous volume of passing traffic can interfere with property 
owners' use and enjoyment of their property without reaching the 
shock wave-producing levels of jet airplanes. 
Moreover, highway traffic produces unique elements of nuisance 
which airplanes do not. Automobiles and trucks produce noxious gases 
and fumes at concentrated levels, and kick up dirt and debris, which 
can substantially interfere with individuals' use and enjoyment of 
property.170 Highways also have attendant safety risks, such as acci-
dents from reckless drivers careening off the roadway, which can rise 
to the level of a taking. l7l Additionally, the glare from the headlights 
of passing vehicles can interfere with a highway abutter's use and 
enjoyment of his or her property.172 Finally, courts have recognized 
169 See Black, supra note 79, at 443. 
170 See State v. Board of Educ., 282 A.2d 71, 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971). 
One commentator has argued that "if [gases and smoke] are turned into the air and allowed 
to pass over adjacent land so as to deprive the owner of the beneficial use of his property, it is 
as much a taking as if it were sewage or water that caused the injury." SACKMAN, supra note 
54, at § 6.10[1] at 6-59. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reported the hazardous effects 
of automobile-produced air pollution, explaining that: 
[E]missions [from automobiles] of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, 
lead and other particulate matter, as well as photochemical oxidants, acid deposition, 
and carbon dioxide, directly and indirectly cause: health effects (irritation of respira-
tory, eye, or other systems; acute toxic systemic effects; mutagenic or carcinogenic 
actions; adverse effects on defense mechanisms against infections); environmental 
damage (material soiling; corrosion; loss of agricultural productivity; acidification of soil 
and water; forest dieback); or nuisance (odor, decreased visibility). 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSPORT AND THE EN-
VIRONMENT 49 (1988). 
171 Lambier v. City of Kennewick, 783 P.2d 596, 597 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 791 
P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990). As a result of the widening of a roadway near the plaintiffs' property, at 
least 11 vehicles crashed on the plaintiffs' property or into their house, causing significant 
damage to their property, resulting in the loss of their insurance policy and the collapse in the 
market value of their home. Id. The Washington Court of Appeals, citing to Thornburg I, 376 
P.2d 100 (Or. 1962) and Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964), eert. denied, 379 
U.S. 989 (1965), held that the interference with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their 
property caused by the road widening constituted a compensable taking. Id. at 598-600; see 
Knight v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 141, 143 (Mont. 1992) (numerous accidents from automobiles 
on or near plaintiffs' properties following widening of roadway was element of interference 
which constituted taking by inverse condemnation). But see Reisenauer v. State, 813 P.2d 375, 
380 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (widening of highway which resulted in multiple accidents on plaintiff's 
yard, including accident where motorist crashed into child's bedroom, was not compensable 
taking because state had compensated previous landowners for right of way approximately 50 
years beforehand). 
172 See Richmond County v. Williams, 137 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. 1964); City of Billings, 642 P.2d 
at 143. 
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that the deleterious effects to property caused by close proximity to 
a highway are compensable when there has been a partial condemna-
tion. l73 It is illogical to assume that the same effects are not serious 
enough to warrant compensation where there has been no condemna-
tion.174 After all, it is the proximity of an individual's property to a 
highway which determines the amount of damage to the property 
from the highway, not whether a part of the property has been con-
demned for the highway construction.175 
2. Shared Burden 
Courts and commentators also maintain that highway noise and 
pollution are unpleasant consequences of a modern, urban, and highly 
mobile society.176 Because, they assert, traffic noise is heard by every-
one, such noise is a common burden shared by everyone.177 However, 
this argument ignores the fact that not all property owners share the 
burden of highway noise and pollution equally.178 Studies have shown 
that highway abutters suffer the annoyances of highways to a greater 
degree than that suffered by nonabutters.179 The intensity of highway 
noise varies from location to location, depending on a variety of fac-
tors, including the distance between the properties and the highway, 
the topography of the surrounding area, and the insulating effect of 
neighboring buildings.l80 Furthermore, the speed, flow, and density of 
traffic also affect noise levels.l8l Higher noise levels also are observ-
able in areas where the number of vehicles traveling a particular 
section of highway is substantial or in areas where the traffic tends 
to follow a stop-and-go pattern.l82 Additionally, the type of traffic can 
173 See supra notes 33-53 and accompanying text. 
174 See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 505. 
175 See id. at 504-06. 
176 See, e.g., Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), eert. 
dismissed, 219 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); State v. Mertz, 778 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); 
Adams v. Department of Highways, 753 P.2d 846, 850 (Mont. 1988); Dennison v. State, 239 
N.E.2d 708, 712 (N.Y. 1968) (Bergan, J., dissenting). 
177 See, e.g., Northcutt, 209 So. 2d at 712; Mertz, 778 S.W.2d at 368; Adams, 753 P.2d at 850; 
Dennison, 239 N.E.2d at 712 (Bergan, J., dissenting). 
178 See Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566 (Cal. Ct. App.1984); Thomsen 
v. State, 170 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1969); City of Yakima v. Dahlin, 485 P.2d 628, 629-31 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1971). 
179 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 13, at 22-26. 
180 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FIGHTING NOISE IN 
THE 1990s 61 (1991); see City of Yakima, 485 P.2d at 629-30 (finding newly constructed highway 
ramp next to plaintiff's warehouse created echo chamber which amplified noise to intolerable 
levels). 
181 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, URBAN TRAFFIC 
NOISE 35 (1971). 
182 Id. 
588 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:563 
affect the noise level coming from the highway insofar as trucks 
create more noise than other vehicles.l83 
3. Cost 
Another argument frequently advanced to oppose compensating 
highway abutters suggests that compensating noncondemned abut-
ting landowners would cause the costs of highway construction to 
skyrocket, effectively halting the development of the nation's infra-
structure.l84 The damages inflicted on abutting property owners, how-
ever, are a real cost of the operation of highways, just as cement, 
girders, and rights-of-way are parts of the costs of a highway.lss Cur-
rently, the cost of damages to abutting properties is being paid for by 
those landowners whose properties were not partially condemned.l86 
It is unfair for the state to shift disproportionately the burden of these 
substantial, hidden costs to noncondemned, abutting landowners.187 
Furthermore, by substantially interfering with property owners' 
use and enjoyment of their property, the government, under the 
theory of condemnation-by-nuisance, has taken the property from the 
individual in violation of the Constitution.l88 Therefore, such a viola-
tion demands redress irrespective of the costs such compensation 
imposes.189 The constitutional requirement of just compensation for 
public taking of private property not only protects individuals against 
uncompensated loss, but also ensures that the government does not 
confiscate property for public projects that the government cannot 
otherwise afford.1OO 
Moreover, given that there has been no floodgate of litigation or 
crippling demand for compensation in the aviation field following the 
183 City of Tulsa v. Mingo Sch. Dist. No. 16,559 P.2d 487, 489 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). 
184 See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1961); 
Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), em. dismissed,219 
So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969); Thomsen v. State, 170 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1969); Adams v. Department 
of Highways, 753 P.2d 846, 850 (Mont. 1988); Harris County v. Felts, 881 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
185 See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 543. 
186 See id. 
187 See People v. Volunteers of Am., 98 Cal. Rptr. 423, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); PAUL, supra 
note 23, at 29; Black, supra note 79, at 455. Paul also elevates the argument to moral grounds, 
arguing that property rights outweigh "considerations of efficiency." PAUL, supra note 23, at 
255; see Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 234. Stoebuck explains, "more in accord with basic notions 
of fairness is the proposition that, if one of two persons must suffer, it should be the one who 
caused the suffering." Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 234. 
188 See SACKMAN, supra note 54, at § 8.01[4] at 8-22. 
189 See id. § 8.0l[ 4][a] at 8-38. 
190 See PAUL, supra note 23, at 29. 
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application of the condemnation-by-nuisance theory to the airport 
cases, litigation and compensation in the highway context likely would 
be scant.191 Arguably, more people live near highways than airports,192 
but not all people living near highways will be able to recover com-
pensation for a taking of their property. Only those property owners 
who can prove a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment 
of their property will be able to recover in a claim of inverse condem-
nation.193 
C. Traveling the Higher Road: A Final Argument for Application 
of the Theory of Condemnation-By-Nuisance to the Highway Cases 
The state courts that decided Thornburg v. Port of Portlandl94 and 
Martin v. Port of Seattle,195 and the courts that followed those deci-
sions,l96 made a significant theoretical leap by doing away with the 
artificial trespass distinction. The courts recognized that landowners 
who live near the flight paths of low-flying airplanes were subjected 
to an equivalent level of damage as those landowners who were com-
pensated for having as little as an airplane's wing-tip pass over their 
property.l97 In applying a condemnation-by-nuisance theory, these courts 
expanded the physical concept of a constitutional taking in recognition 
of the fact that modern nontrespassory activities have the same ca-
pacity for interfering with an individual's property interests as actual 
and direct physical invasions.198 
Ultimately, the debate boils down to an issue of fairness. It is 
fundamentally unjust that two homes, similarly situated near a high-
way, are subject to differing standards of compensation merely be-
cause one owner had a portion of property condemned-no matter 
how small-and one did not. Once the partially condemned landowner 
has been compensated for the portion of land physically taken from 
him or her, then that landowner becomes identically situated to a 
191 See Black, supra note 79, at 444. 
192 See Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), een. 
dismissed, 219 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1969). 
193 See Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 231--32, 234. 
194 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962). 
190 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964). 
196 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866 (Cal. 1985), een. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1964), een. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965); Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n of 
Minneapolis & St. Paul, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1974); Henthorn v. City of Oklahoma City, 453 
P.2d 1013 (Okl. 1969). 
197 See Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 220-21. 
198 See id. at 220-21, 236. 
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neighbor who had no land condemned. Courts, however, distinguish 
the former as deserving of compensation for the consequential dam-
ages of abutting a highway.l99 In light of the realities of damages 
caused to abutting landowners, this sweeping distinction is arbitrary 
and indefensible.2°O As one court has noted, "although the courts have 
recognized that the taking or abutting requirements yield incongru-
ous, nonsensical results in many cases the prevailing rules of proxim-
ity damages [have been] not the logic of distance but the accident of 
location of the injury-producing activity."20l 
It is time that courts discard the antiquated physical invasion re-
quirement and adopt a condemnation-by-nuisance approach to in-
verse condemnation claims of highway abutters.202 To the extent that 
condemnation-by-nuisance is a matter of law, adoption of such a prin-
ciple would not mean that our courts would automatically consign 
themselves to hold for every plaintiff who alleges damages to his or 
her property from the property's proximity to a newly constructed or 
widened highway. Before a plaintiff may recover for such alleged 
damages, the legal principle requires a showing of substantial inter-
ference to his or her property.203 This question of a substantial inter-
ference to property, and thus the decisive question of whether or not 
there has been a taking, is ultimately a question of fact to be decided 
by a jury.204 Courts must first resolve the underlying question of law 
by recognizing that such a taking is possible. 
199 See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 506; supra notes 33-53 and accompanying text. 
200 See Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 236. Stoebuck cogently argues that, "perhaps there was a 
time when the distinction between trespassory and nuisance-type activities bore some reason-
able relation to the capacity for interfering with interests in land. If so, that time is past, and 
today's law should comport with today's realities." ld. 
201 Harding v. Department of Transp., 205 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
202 See Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 236. 
2031d. at 231---32. 
204 See Thornburg II, 415 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Or. 1966). The Oregon Supreme Court detailed the 
process that should be applied in trials. First the judge can screen the evidence to weed out 
cases which involve "mere annoyance or interference of a kind that would be objectionable only 
to the supersensitive." ld. at 752. It is then up to the jury to decide if the alleged interference 
is substantial enough to constitute a taking and, if so, how much compensation is due. ld. at 
752-53. 
The court can tell the jury by way of special instruction in this type of case that there 
is a difference between negligible, or inconsequential, interferences which all property 
owners must share and the direct, peculiar, and substantial interferences which result 
in a loss of market value to the extent that a disinterested observer would characterize 
the loss as a taking. It is then for the jury to decide from all the evidence upon which 
side of the line a particular controverted nuisance falls. 
ld. at 753. 
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V. END OF THE ROAD: THE CONCLUSION 
Current judicial interpretation of taking law denies compensation 
to a landowner whose property suffers damages from its proximity to 
a newly constructed or widened highway if no portion of the property 
was condemned for a highway project.205 This standard recognizes 
that a piece of property's proximity to a highway can result in com-
pensable damages but, illogically and unfairly, only where there has 
been a partial condemnation.206 Courts should look towards the airport 
cases where a theory of inverse condemnation, predicated on proof 
that a public use creates a substantial interference with an individual's 
use and enjoyment of his or her property, has allowed adversely 
affected landowners to receive compensation for damages attribut-
able to aircraft noise.207 Application of this condemnation-by-nuisance 
theory by courts in the highway context would provide an overdue 
remedy for highway abutters. 
205 See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 33-53 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 76--144 and accompanying text. 
